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On January 26, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (―CFTC‖ or
―Commission‖) issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Position Limits for Derivatives 1
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (the ―Dodd-Frank
Act‖). The proposed rules are designed to implement the historic Congressional mandate of the
Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Section 737 of Dodd-Frank, to ban excessive
speculation from the derivatives market, i.e., the speculation which exceeds the need for liquidity
by commercial handlers hedging price risk in these markets. Section 737 is the result of multiyear consideration by Congress, during which a strong consensus was reached there that
excessive speculation by Too Big to Fail banks in commodity derivatives markets is the source
of an unnecessary and huge premium paid by consumers worldwide to bolster casino-like betting
on commodity price direction.
However, the proposed rules are so weak that they defy the Congressional intent.
Specifically, the proposed limits on big bank speculation are so high that they will have no
meaningful effect on limiting speculation, leading to wholly unnecessary price volatility and
unpredictability in commodity staples. Moreover, the proposed big bank exemption from
speculative limits must be removed from the final rule, because it enshrines the Too Big to Fail
financial institutions‘ casino-like atmosphere where passive wealthy investors and institutions
are encouraged for a handsome bank transaction fee to do nothing more than gamble on the
future price of commodities.
The ―cost/benefit‖ analysis here is simple. If the Commission follows the plain language
of Dodd-Frank and its legislative intent, it will, by harnessing excessive speculation, ban
gambling on the price direction of critical commodity staples that contributes nothing to
commodity production, yet plays havoc in unmooring the price of food and energy from market
fundamentals.
The Recent Surge in Commodity Prices Has Tolled On the Global Economic Recovery and
Imposed a Serious Threat on the Lives of People from Third World Countries
In recent months as the effects of the Great Recession drag on, the personal finances of
most American consumers, workers, and retirees have taken a serious beating because of
destabilizing price spikes in traditional physical commodities, such as oil, gasoline, heating oil,
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and basic food staples.3 As one prime example, we have seen uncontrollable volatility in crude
oil prices during the last two years: with no substantial underlying change in supply and demand,
the price of crude increased from $40 per barrel in March 2009 to $80 in March 2010 and to
$105 in March 2011.4 During the same time, the world oil demand increased by 4.3 mb/d.5
Notably, the world oil supply increased 4.2 mb/d.6 Furthermore, the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization‘s economist, Abdolreza Abbassian, recently stated: ―In terms of price levels
internationally I think the situation is certainly getting closer to the levels that we had seen (in
2007/2008).‖7 He further added that although wheat and rice are so far fairly balanced,
increasing food price volatility was alarming and could threaten future food security.8
A report from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has stated:
―The 2008 food price crisis was unique in that… it was characterized by massive amounts of
novel forms of speculation in commodity derivative markets.‖9 This food crisis has caused a
devastating impact on other counties. Catholic Missionary David Kane of Maryknoll Lay
Missioners Office of Global Concerns, who has a leadership role in coordinating worldwide
hunger relief organizations relating to excessive speculation, recently stated: ―Whatever happens
to the recovery at home, soaring food prices appear certain to drive the global poor deeper into
destitution this year.‖10 He further noted, ―[People from third world countries are] used to living
on very little, and the fact that spontaneous food riots broke out all over the world demonstrates
how desperate things got in 2008, and how desperate they are now.‖11
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/056db69c-1836-11e0-88c9-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HWnvr4xg (quoting Fatih Birol,
Chief Economist, International Energy Agency: ―Oil prices are entering a dangerous zone for the global economy….
The oil import bills are becoming a threat to the economic recovery. This is a wake-up call to the oil consuming
countries and to the oil producers.‖). See also Alejandro Barbajosa, Oil Price Volatility to Increase in 2011 - HSH
Nordbank, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 2011, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE70521U20110106 (quoting
Sintje Diek, Oil Analyst, HSH NordBank: ―The economic development is not so bad this time and the recovery will
continue, but it will not be so dynamic. At the moment, oil prices are too high for this kind of economic
environment.‖).
4
Price data for Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel), ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcd.htm.
5
See International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://omrpublic.iea.org/World/Wb_all.pdf.
6
See International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report 31-32 (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/10feb11full.pdf (the world oil supply data is only available through January
2011).
7
Svetlana Kovalyova, Food prices near '08 levels, supply stronger, REUTERS NEWS (Nov. 2, 2010).
8
Id. (emphasis added).
9
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, FOOD COMMODITIES SPECULATION AND FOOD PRICE CRISES,
September 2010, available at http://www.materialien.org/agrar/20102309_un.pdf.
10
Zach Carter and Ryan Grim, Gambling On Hunger: Is Wall Street Fueling Global Unrest?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/gambling-on-hunger-food-crisisregulators_n_823725.html.
11
Id.

Page 2 of 19

According to the IHS Global Insight study, ―a $10 rise in the price of a barrel [of oil]
fully passed through will raise the pump price of gasoline by about 24 cents [, which will result
in] an extra gasoline spending bill [by U.S. consumers] of $29.6 billion.‖12
As this country struggles to emerge from the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression, the recent run up in basic commodity staple prices presents a dire threat that the
financial stability of the United States and world economy will reach its breaking point and that
we will plunge back into a double-dip recession with no safety net. This time there will certainly
be no bailouts or stimulus package to provide the economy with a soft landing.
Indeed, as universally predicted in September 2008 without TARP and stimulus, the U.S.
economy would have been headed into a Second Great Depression. Further price spikes in
everyday necessities will tank any potential economic recovery, leading to further and more
sustained economic hardship for the already financially overburdened American taxpayer,
consumer, worker, and retiree.
In light of this, the Commission‘s effort to implement speculative position limits in order
to bring transparency to the markets and to stabilize the commodities prices warrants strong
support and careful adherence is needed not only to the clear Congressional mandate pertaining
to this issue, but to the overwhelming support for control of excessive speculation in the studies
and reports relating to this subject.
Moreover, imposition of position limits is almost risk free. Position limits ensure
liquidity to futures markets, thereby sustaining commercial hedgers for whom the markets have
been statutorily created. Similarly, they are designed to blunt excessive speculation, i.e.,
speculation that goes beyond the provision of liquidity. Blocking speculation of that kind is
merely the stopping of a casino-like atmosphere, i.e., betting on the upward direction of
commodity staples. Stopping that kind of passive betting, which adds nothing to production of
energy or food, is identical to closing down betting parlors. It would have an infinitesimal effect
on the real economy. Too little attention has been paid to the virtually riskless act of stopping
excessive commodity gambling.
U.S. Congress Mandates the CFTC to Impose Strong Position Limits
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to follow the provisions of that statute,
which amends various sections of the Commodity Exchange Act. 13 The fundamental purpose of
the CEA is ―to insure fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to
provide a measure of control over those forms of speculative activity which too often demoralize
the markets to the injury of producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.‖14 Indeed,
President Roosevelt, when introducing what became the CEA in 1934, said: ―[I]t should be our
national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative
12

Nigel Gault, Oil Prices and the U.S. Economy: Some Rules of Thumb, IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, Feb. 24, 2011,
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operations.‖15 In this regard, the House Agriculture Committee also stated: ―This bill authorizes
the Commission . . . to fix limitations upon purely speculative trades . . .‖16
Section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act pertaining to position limits was created with a goal
that is wholly consistent with the CEA, but it requires the CFTC to strengthen position limits to
cover all derivatives markets. Section 737 emphatically provides that the Commission ―shall by
rule, regulation, or order establish limits on the amount of positions, as appropriate, other than
bona fide hedge positions that may be held by any person[.]‖17 The language could not be
clearer. The Commission is required to establish position limits as Congress intentionally used
the word, ―shall,‖ to impose the mandatory obligation. According to the CRS Report for
Congress on Statutory Interpretation, ―[u]se of ‗shall‘ and ‗may‘ in statutes also mirrors common
usage; ordinarily ‗shall‘ is mandatory and ‗may‘ is permissive.‖18
This congressional intent is bolstered by the fact that the word, ―shall,‖ replaced the word
―may‖ in the House version of the Dodd-Frank Act, then titled, ―The Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2009.19 In particular, when the House version of the bill was
introduced on December 2, 2009, Section 3113 on Position Limits stated: ―The Commission
may, by rule or regulation, establish limits (including related hedge exemption provisions) on the
aggregate number or amount of positions in contracts based upon the same underlying
commodity (as defined by the Commission) that may be held by any person, including any group
or class of traders[.]‖20 However, when the House passed the bill by 223 to 202 on December
11, 2009, the word, ―may‖ was replaced with ―shall‖ pursuant to the former House Agriculture
Committee Chairman Collin Peterson‘s amendment. During the floor debate, Congressman
Peterson said ―the amendment strengthens confidence in trader position limits on physically
deliverable commodities as a way to prevent excessive speculative trading.‖21 In doing so, he
has indicated that it was his intention to strengthen the position limits by imposing on the
Commission the mandatory obligation to adopt strong position limits. This amendment has been
incorporated into the bill, survived the conference negotiations, and was eventually enacted into
law.
Other members of Congress share the same view that the CFTC has a mandatory
obligation pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act to impose position limits. Senator Maria Cantwell, a
particularly active legislator on the question of position limits, announced her support for the
final version of the legislation on July 1, 2010, ensuring at that time that there would be 60 votes
15
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in favor of final passage of the Act, thereby ensuring cloture. She stated: ―[T]he conference
report mandates aggregate position limits across all exchanges[.] The conference report directs
the CFTC to use position limits to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation, disrupt
market manipulation, and ensure price discovery is not disrupted.‖22
Furthermore, the usage of both ―shall‖ and ―may‖ in the same provision ―underscore[s]
their different meanings.‖23 Specifically, the provision states ―the Commission shall by rule,
regulation, or order establish limits on the amount of positions, as appropriate, other than bona
fide hedge positions, that may be held by any person […].‖24 As such, the legislative intent to
impose the mandatory obligation to adopt position limits is clearly shown.
The CFTC is Required to Impose Position Limits Prophylactically
The plain reading of §737 reveals that the phrase ―as appropriate‖ modifies only those
position limits mandated to be imposed, i.e., the mandatory position limits must be promulgated
―as appropriate.‖ The term ―as appropriate‖ does not modify the heavily emphasized mandate
that there ―shall‖ be position limits. The emphasis of certain commenters in opposition to the
creation of position limits that the words ―as appropriate‖ make the imposition of limits wholly
discretionary is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history. In short,
speculator opponents of position limits want to put the worked ―may‖ back into the statute when
that discretionary language was expressly and emphatically removed.
Moreover, speculator opposition to imposition of position limits read into the phrase ―as
appropriate‖ that the Commission can impose position limits only after the Commission
―conduct[s] a complete analysis of the swap market data.‖25 Not only does this interpretation run
contrary to legislative intent, it also contradicts other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act for the
following two reasons.
First, Dodd-Frank requires the Commission to set limits to, inter alia, diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation and to deter and prevent market manipulation,
squeezes, and corners.26 In other words, the purpose of position limits is not to punish past
wrongdoing, but rather to deter and prevent potential future dysfunctions in the commodity
staples derivatives markets. Because the purpose of position limits is to prevent future
violations, the Commission should not be required to appreciate the complete and precise level
of excessive speculation prior to taking action – an action made impossible by the jurisdictional
22
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Legislation, July 1, 2010, available at http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=326165 (emphasis added).
23
YULE KIM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS, August 31, 2008, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (citing federal case law:
―Congress‘ use of the permissive ‗may‘ … contrasts with the legislators‘ use of a mandatory ‗shall‘ in the very same
section.‖ Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001). ―[I]n the law to be construed here it is evident that the word
‗may‘ is used in special contradistinction to the word ‗shall.‘‖ United States ex rel. Siegel v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353,
359-60 (1895)).
24
Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, § 737 (emphasis added).
25
See, e.g., Statement of Jill E. Sommers, Commissioner, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Open
Meeting on the Ninth Series of Proposed Rulemakings under the Dodd-Frank Act, January 13, 2011, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/sommersstatement011311.html.
26
Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, § 737 (emphasis added).

Page 5 of 19

limits previously imposed upon the CFTC (and the rest of the federal government) by many
factors emanating from the deregulation regime put in place by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act27. Because the CFTC previously had no jurisdiction over swaps, it was never
properly equipped to comprehend the exact level of excessive speculation across all derivatives
markets. It is only with the passage of Dodd-Frank that the Commission now has broad
authority to collect data in the swaps markets.
Second, a close reading of the legislative intent reveals that the Commission is not
required to conduct a thorough study of the possible effects of the position limits prior to
adopting its final rule on position limits. Rather, Section 719 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
requires the Commission ―to conduct a study of the effects of the position limits imposed
pursuant to the other provisions of this title on excessive speculation and on the movement of
transactions.‖28 The Commission is required to submit the report ―within 12 months after the
imposition of position limits pursuant to the other provisions of this title.‖29 Why would
Congress specifically require the Commission to submit a report after imposing position limits if
it had provided by statute (as opponents of position limits mistakenly argue) that the data must be
available before the position limit rule is finally promulgated? The short answer is that Congress
clearly understood the imminent danger excessive speculation and passive betting on price
direction had caused by uncontrollable increases in the prices of energy and agricultural
commodities. Therefore, the Commission is statutorily obligated to impose the ―appropriate‖
position limits. To reiterate, Mr. Fekrat, Senior Special Counsel at the CFTC, is wholly correct
when he stated that ―the Commission may impose position limits prophylactically, based on its
reasonable judgment that such limits are necessary for the purpose of ‗diminishing, eliminating,
or preventing‘ such burdens.‖30
Numerous Studies Have Concluded that Excessive Speculation Has Significant Impact on the
Spot Market Price
Because Congress, after years of study and consideration, mandated that the
Commission impose position limits, the question whether independent studies support
Congress‘s mandate is wholly irrelevant. It is not for the Commission to rescind Congress‘s
mandate based on its own reading of economic analysis. As shown below, however, even if it
were relevant, there is overwhelming and impressive support for Congress‘s finding that
excessive speculation causes intense volatility and upward price pressures on basic commodity
staples. One of the fundamental purposes of futures contracts is to provide price discovery in the
―cash‖ or ―spot‖ markets.31 Those selling or buying commodities in the ―spot‖ markets rely on
futures prices to judge amounts to charge or pay for the delivery of a commodity. 32 Since the
27
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creation of futures contracts in the agricultural context decades ago, it has been widely accepted
that excessive speculation undermines the price discovery function of the futures markets. 33 This
distortion of economic fundamentals is otherwise manifested by unnecessary and substantial
price increases that consumers around the world pay for energy, especially crude oil and other
everyday consumer staples.
Those who oppose position limits regularly argue that there is a lack of empirical data
demonstrating that excessive speculation has unnecessarily and dramatically increased the price
of energy and agricultural commodities. For example, Terry Duffy of the CME Group stated
during the March 3, 2011 hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry that ―there‘s been absolutely no evidence that [speculators] have anything to do with the
effect of price whether it comes from an academic, whether it comes from a government study or
anything else. So just want to put that clear.‖34 This is simply totally and completely incorrect.
As recently as February 24, 2011, the Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition35 to wide
fanfare released a list of over 50 studies showing the adverse effects of speculation on energy
and food prices.36 In particular, this list includes, inter alia, studies from many of the nation‘s
most prominent academics from Stanford, Texas A&M, MIT, Rice, University of London,

33

See, e.g., Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange
in the United States, 1875-1905, AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 307 (2006) (quoting Fictitious Dealings in
Agricultural Products: House Comm. on Agric. Committee Hearing Reports (1892): ―[T]he man who managed or
sold or owned those immense wheat fields has not as much to say with the regard to the price of the wheat that some
young fellow who stands howling around the Chicago wheat pit could actually sell in a day.‖).
34
See Transcript of Implementation of Title VII of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, 112th Cong. (March 3, 2011) (Statement of Terry
Duffy, Executive Chairman, CME Group). See also Jim Spencer and Dee DePass, As we pay more at the pump, oil
trading curbs still on hold, STAR TRIBUNE (March 20, 2011) (quoting Tom LaSala, Chief Regulatory Officer, CME
Group: ―There is no empirical evidence that excessive speculation has affected prices.‖).
35
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Coalition (CMOC)?, available at http://commoditymarketsoversight.org/.
36
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http://commoditymarketsoversight.org/ (last visited on March 17, 2011).
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Princeton, and NYU,37 well-known economists, 38 market participants,39 and bipartisan
Congressional reports40 showing that unchecked excessive speculation leads to dysfunctions in
commodity market pricing mechanisms. As recently as March 23, 2011, Stanford Professor

37

DAVID P. ANDERSON, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL & FOOD POLICY CENTER, THE EFFECTS OF
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Kenneth Singleton has released a study demonstrating a positive correlation between the
commodity index fund positions and the oil prices.‖41
Here, the Commission should note the expert analysis of industry participants that the
current oil price does not reflect market fundamentals. For example, the chief counsel at one of
the largest airlines, Delta Air Lines, recently stated that ―the marginal cost of oil production is
now $60 to $70 a barrel,‖42 compared to the current WTI price of $105 as of March 22, 2011.
Whatever debate remains over the question whether excessive speculation significantly
impacts price volatility should be put to rest completely by the last of a series of three bipartisan
staff reports of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (―PSI‖), which on June 24,
2009 (with the express endorsement of both PSI Chair Senator Carl Levin and Ranking Member
Senator Tom Coburn)43 demonstrated conclusively that:






―[o]ver the past four years … increases in wheat prices were nearly as steep as the
increases in the price of oil,‖44 during which period wheat prices rose ―to record
heights‖;45
there is ―significant and persuasive evidence that the large number of wheat futures
contracts (long open interest) held by commodity index traders is a primary reason for the
pricing problems in the wheat market … including … the disconnect between wheat
futures prices and cash market fundamentals … during 2008‖;46
―commodity index instruments were, in essence, speculative bets‖;47and
―[t]he total value of the speculative investments in commodity indexes has increased an
estimated tenfold in five years, from an estimated $15 billion in 2003, to around $200
billion by mid-2008.‖48

Investments in commodity indexes are ―purchased mainly by financial institutions,
insurance companies, pension funds, foundations, hedge funds and wealthy individuals[.]‖49 The
purchases of these index instruments have resulted in the injection of billions of dollars in

41
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passive, long investments into the agricultural, energy, and metals futures markets.‖ 50 Recently,
CFTC Commissioner Chilton stated: ―Hedge funds and other speculators have increased their
positions in energy markets by 64 percent since June 2008 to the highest level on record.‖ 51 He
further stated: ―Between June of 2008 and January of 2011, futures equivalent contracts held by
these types of speculators increased 64 percent in energy contracts. In June of 2008, the number
of such contracts totaled 617,000. By September of 2010, they were 923,000. And, by January
of this year, they had grown to 1,011,000.‖52 Without imposing timely and effective position
limits, the numbers of contracts held by these speculators will continue to increase, while more
American workers, consumers and retirees face unreasonably and unwarranted high commodity
prices.
Position Limits Will Reduce Price Volatility and Unpredictability
The tension between commercial producers and consumers trying to achieve fair prices
for the sale and/or purchase of physical commodities through the public transparent hedging
process moors these price discovery futures markets to economic fundamentals and,
correspondingly, ensures fair market prices to the ultimate consumers of these commodities.
Speculators are indeed part of the market. They have a role to play in the hedging
function when they are needed to ensure that the market has liquidity. However, speculators‘
motivations do not include ensuring fair prices. Rather, they are simply betting on the direction
of the market and their sole interest is that the markets go as high or as low as possible in support
of their betting strategy. To the extent the speculator is providing liquidity for physical hedgers,
the speculator is serving a public interest by assisting in the hedging function. In this sense,
―speculators provide a buffer.‖53 When speculation is ―excessive,‖ however, those market
―bets,‖ as shown in the bi-partisan Wheat Report described above, unmoor the market from
fundamentals and, correspondingly, drive the hedger from the markets because of volatility and
unpredictability. This is not a matter of having ―no buffer capacity,‖54 but rather having an
unnecessarily large buffer that is upending the commodity derivatives markets.
It is the historic purpose of position limits to draw a line between the speculation that is
needed to create liquidity for commercial hedgers and the speculation that unmoors markets from
price fundamentals, requiring consumers worldwide to put money in the hands of those who
have no role in the production of the underlying commodities.
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It is widely understood that ―increasing volatility makes it more expensive for producers
and consumers to use futures as a hedge.‖55 If commercial interests cannot hedge in a fair and
orderly market, they and their ultimate consumers, the public at large, are left to the mercy of
volatile markets that undercut the hedging function. One needs to look no further than the airline
industry to realize that a lack of effective position limits had a ―huge impact on airlines.‖56 Some
of the world‘s largest airlines have said that out of control volatilities in the oil prices is ―a kind
of silent killer.‖57 The latest problem has to do with the costs associated with locking in fuel
prices for a year. According to Professor Anderson, the price volatility has caused ―the loss of
the ability to use futures markets for price risk management due to the inability to finance margin
requirements.‖58 At least one consultant thinks the industry should stop hedging outright and
handle volatile fuel prices with surcharges.59
A contract market dominated by speculators changes the market from one that
constructively hedges risk to ensure pricing based on market fundamentals into a casino-like
atmosphere consisting of bets on market direction unmoored from real world market
responsibilities. One of the main benefits of position limits is to prevent sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of commodities. In other words, the position
limits are designed to minimize the price volatilities, therefore stabilizing the commodity prices.
When there is less volatility in price, the cost of hedging will necessarily decrease.
Finally, creating position limits has no meaningful adverse affect on the real economy.
Position limits are designed to permit sufficient speculation to afford liquidity to commercial
users of derivatives markets. They also limit the scope of gambling – for gambling‘s sake – on
upward price directional bets on energy and food staples worldwide. Stopping excessive
gambling will not undercut production one whit. It will cause no economic pain except to the
too big to fail casinos, including the world‘s biggest futures exchange, who want to create profits
off the backs of the American consumer, worker and retiree.
The cost benefit analysis here is quite simple. By stopping unproductive gambling by
passive wealthy investors that exceeds the provision of liquidity, consumers here and worldwide
will pay fair, market driven prices for their everyday needs.
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The Proposed Levels on Speculation Are So High That They Will Have No Meaningful Effect
On Limiting Destabilizing Price Volatility in Basic Commodity Staples
In this vein, the proposed position limits rules are so lax as to be virtually meaningless in
driving excessive speculation from the markets. At best, they permit the excessive speculation
that now exists and now distorts prices with the mere possibility of limiting future increased
speculation. That result defies Congressional intent and asks consumers worldwide to grant a
further hidden subsidy to Too Big to Fail Banks and futures exchanges with the provision of
absolutely no contribution to increased production.
Proposed §151.4 would impose position limits for physical delivery contracts. 60 For
implementation of the proposed rules, two stages are prescribed. First, the CFTC would enforce
spot-month limits by setting position limits at 25 percent of estimated deliverable supply.
During the second phase, the CFTC would impose position limits for non-spot-month contracts
based on open interest on a particular referenced contract. Under a formula proposed by the
Commission, non-spot-month position limits will be set for each referenced contract at 10
percent of open interest in that contract up to the first 25,000 contracts, and 2.5 percent
thereafter.
However, these levels are so high that they will have no meaningful effect on excessive
speculation. According to Ben Hirst, a general counsel at Delta Air Lines, the CFTC‘s currently
proposed limit on speculative position – 25 percent of available supply – is far too high and
―[they] are not proposing to adopt rules that will have any effect on speculation[.] They are only
making sure no one can corner the market.‖61 In other words, while the proposed levels may be
effective to prevent market manipulation, they are insufficient to prevent the wholly separate
statutory objective of stopping excessive speculation, which requires no showing of intent; but,
nevertheless in the aggregate constrains market fundamentals.
For example, in order to corner the market, one might need to control the majority of the
available supply for that commodity. However, one would not need to control the majority of
available supply to engage in excessive speculation. Aggregate betting on the price direction of
commodities by many speculators can, without any intent, destabilize markets. The CEA defines
―excessive speculation‖ as any commodity under contracts of sale ―causing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity.‖62 Therefore,
speculative betting that exceeds that needed to create liquidity for commercial handlers causes
price changes that defy market fundamentals of supply and demand and has been historically
banned as excessive speculation.
It must therefore be remembered that manipulation of markets which evidences intent of
wrongdoing is completely different from excessive speculation which can occur by flooding of
the market by thousands of passive price directional bettors who destroy the market without
necessarily any adverse intent.
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In the proposal, the Commission fails to clearly distinguish between market manipulation
and excessive speculation. In particular, the provided justification for the proposed spot-month
position limits is: ―The formula seeks to minimize the potential for corners and squeezes by
facilitating the orderly liquidation of positions.‖63 This justification is only valid for preventing
market manipulation, not excessive speculation. In order to achieve the goal of preventing
excessive speculation and to satisfy the wholly separate statutorily mandated regulatory tool of
position limits, the Commission must reconsider whether the proposed levels are sufficient to
prevent ―excessive speculation‖ in the marketplace as a whole. By ignoring the legislative
mandate for position limits, which goes all the way back the 1936 CEA, the Commission in its
proposed rule has written out all concern for excessive speculation. That defies the most clear
Congressional intent and would, if finalized, be a flat violation of the statute.
More appropriate position levels should be set to ensure that the position limits would
serve to prevent excessive speculation and to ensure that the price discovery function of the
market is not disrupted by the speculators. To achieve this, the Commission should set the
position levels at five percent of open interest up to the first 25,000 contracts, and 2.5 percent
thereafter across all markets. This formula is similar to the one that was proposed by Michael
Masters during the March 25, 2010 testimony before the Commission. He suggested: ―No single
non-commercial entity should ever be allowed to represent more than 5 [percent] of a market‘s
total open interest under any circumstances.‖64 However, in order to accommodate both large
open interest and small open interest for different commodities, the 2.5 percent additional
flexibility beyond the first 25,000 contracts is acceptable.
Bona Fide Hedging Activities Should Not Include Financial Interests of Swap Dealers
Although the Commission‘s proposal to adopt a bona fide hedging exemption for traders
hedging commercial risks to the extent of their demonstrated needs 65 merits support, the
Commission must impose a strict standard for granting such an exemption. In particular, the
proposed rules should not exclude swap dealers‘ financial risk management transactions from
position limits, which essentially give the Too Big to Fail banks a license to keep their casinos
open to wealthy investors for passive bets on the upward direction of commodity staples with no
benefit (and indeed great liability) to the American consumer.
In the proposed rules, the Commission relies on a definition from regulation 1.3(z), under
which bona fide hedging includes ―transactions or positions [that] normally represent a substitute
for transactions to be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing
channel, and where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct
and management of a commercial enterprise.‖66 However, the Commission has adopted some of
the biggest swap dealers‘ and futures exchanges‘ arguments and provided exemptions for
―products and services similar to [risk management products offered by swap dealers] to qualify
63
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as bona fide hedging transactions or positions.‖67 This would permit swap dealers to continue
―to manage the risk of a swap portfolio (i.e., their casino like function of allowing wealthy
investors to bet on the upward price of commodity staples) that exists at the time of
implementation of the proposed regulations.‖68 This approach would completely undermine the
primary target of the Dodd-Frank position limits provision.
According to the bi-partisan Wheat Report, the CFTC has prior to the passage of DoddFrank granted informal and opaque hedging exemptions to four swaps dealers for wheat futures
trading on the Chicago futures exchange since 2005. These exemptions allow the dealers to
hedge exposure against their commodity index swaps investors. The Report states: ―Those
exemptions permit the swaps dealers to hold up to 10,000, 17,500, 26,000, and 53,000 wheat
futures contracts.‖69 Adding CFTC staff hedging exemptions granted to ETFs, those ―six index
traders … hold a total of up to almost 130,000 wheat futures contracts in any single month and in
all months combined‖ measured against an allowable limit of 39,000 contracts in the absence of
the hedge exemptions.70 Thus, those six commodity index traders ―may have held as much as
60% of the long open interest in‖ CME wheat futures contracts.71 The Report further states: ―If
each swap dealer were restricted to holding no more than 6,500 wheat futures contract at any
given time [i.e., limited to the spot month CFTC-established position limit] these swaps dealers
would have had to find another way to offset their financial exposure to the commodity index
swaps they sold, or to assume the outright risk from those swaps.‖72
The bi-partisan Wheat Report concluded that ―the activities of the commodity index
traders, in the aggregate, constituted ‗excessive speculation‘ in the wheat market under the
Commodity Exchange Act‖ and that ―the CFTC [must] phase out existing exemptions and
waivers that allow some index traders to operate outside of trading limits designed to prevent
excessive speculation.‖73 In response to the bi-partisan Wheat Report, the CFTC withdrew two
no-action letters granting relief from Federal speculative position limits on August 18, 2009.74
Recently, Commissioner Dunn stated: ―The impact that position limits would have on
energy markets is unclear,‖ noting agricultural futures have been high and volatile since 2007
despite having speculative curbs.75 However, agricultural futures markets have been subject to
many of the same informal and opaque swap dealer exemptions as has been true of the energy
futures markets. Even though the position limits were imposed by the Commission for
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agricultural futures and the exchanges for energy futures, they both used the same exemption for
swap dealers hedging their casino-like operations. That explains fully why agricultural and
energy prices were in a simultaneous bubble from 2004 through 2008 and why they are in a
simultaneous bubble now.
As the bipartisan Congressional report recommends, swap dealers hedging their risk from
price directional bets by their wealthy customers are the very cause of the commodity bubbles.
To grant them a ―bona fide hedger‖ exemption is to ask consumers around the world to pay a
speculator‘s premium on basic commodity staples that has nothing to do with production of real
commodities. This flies in the face of position limits as enacted in 1936 and those broader limits
enacted again in 2010 by Dodd-Frank. To allow Too Big to Fail Banks to continue disrupting
market fundamentals worldwide would defy what Congress has intended. Commissioners have
to decide if they are on the side of the big banks and the big futures exchanges or on the side of
the American taxpayer, consumer, worker and retiree.
The Commission must remove the swap dealer‘s financial interest exemptions from the
final rules, limiting exemptions to businesses that deal in physical commodities and use markets
to hedge commercial risk in those commodities.
Exemptions to the Position Limits Should Not Be Permitted Retroactively
The proposed rules would provide ―a limited exemption for positions in DCM contracts
for future delivery or option contracts that are in excess of a position limit, provided that they
were established in good faith prior to the effective date of a position limit set by rule, regulation
or order.‖76 Furthermore, the Commission would provide a blanket exemption from the position
limits to ―Dodd-Frank Act pre-effective date swaps‖ because swaps are generally longer lived
than futures contracts and thus position limits impacting pre-effective date swaps could
unnecessarily disrupt position hedging through swap positions.77
However, these exemptions are wholly unjustified. As mentioned above, it has been
repeatedly proven that the swap dealer exemptions have allowed those swap dealers to enter into
excessive speculative transactions in the wheat market. According to the bi-partisan Wheat
Report, ―four swap dealers selling index-related swaps currently operate with hedge exemptions
that allow them to hold much larger positions on the Chicago wheat futures market than would
otherwise apply under the CFTC‘s speculative position limits.‖78 Allowing those exemptions to
continue would not only undermine the purpose of position limits, but it would also drive
excessive speculation in other commodity markets as well.
Proposed ―Estimated Deliverable Supply‖ Is an Appropriate Basis for Determining Position
Limits
In calculating the position limits, the Commission proposed to use ―estimated deliverable
supply,‖ which will be determined by the Commission on an annual basis following receipt of an
76
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estimate of deliverable supply by the applicable designated contract market.79 This deliverable
supply information would not include supplies that ―could be procured at unreasonably high
prices or diverted from non-standard locations.‖80 Also, it would not include supply that is
―committed for long-term agreements and would therefore not be available to fulfill the delivery
obligations arising from current trading.‖81
Some market participants have argued that the proposed position limits would ―unfairly
exclude certain futures contracts from its definition of available supply, effectively reducing the
number of contracts traders can hold.‖82 However, in calculating the position limits, it is
necessary that the deliverable supply reflects the market‘s normal and rational behavior in order
to capture the most reasonable data. Furthermore, the deliverable data should only capture the
―annual‖ data as the position limits would be imposed on an annual basis. Therefore, excluding
delivery obligations that are not arising from the current trading is reasonable. In light of this,
the proposed method of calculating deliverable supply warrants strong support since it is
designed to weed out irrational and unreasonable data.
Also, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (―SIFMA‖) has argued
that the Commission should use ―available deliverable supply‖ instead of the proposed
―estimated deliverable supply‖ in calculating the spot-month position limit.83 SIFMA reasons
that since available deliverable supply is ―supply that can be made readily available for delivery
under contract terms[, this historical data] provides a more accurate benchmark.‖84 However, the
SIFMA proposal denies the Commission the necessary regulatory flexibility to offer and rely on
its own analysis.
The proposed rule would provide this necessary regulatory flexibility as the Commission
would make a final determination after considering ―the DCM‘s estimate in conjunction with
analyzing its own data and reviewing position limit related DCM filings.‖85 In a market where
significant regulatory change is ongoing, the regulatory flexibility authorized under the proposed
rule will ensure that the Commission is able to properly respond to ever changing market
conditions.
Account Aggregation Proposals Warrant Support
The proposed rule, § 151.7, to establish account aggregation standards specifically for
positions in referenced contracts should be included in the final rule. This rule would require
that the position limits in referenced contracts be applied to all positions in accounts in which
―any trader, directly or indirectly, has an ownership or equity interest of 10 percent or greater or,
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controls trading.‖86 Under the current rules, commodity pool operators, limited partners, and
futures commission merchants are not required to aggregate their positions. However, upon
adoption, the proposed rule would mandate aggregation of those positions at the pool level.
Hence, a trader would have to aggregate positions in multiple accounts or pools, including
passively managed index funds, if those accounts or pools have identical trading strategies. This
would enable the Commission to effectively monitor and enforce the position limits by
preventing a hedge fund from creating multiple mini-hedge funds and hold five times the
position limits.
Proposed Position Visibility Requirements Should Be Imposed on Referenced Agricultural
Contracts
Proposed § 151.6 would establish position visibility reporting requirements for
referenced energy and precious metals contracts. The position visibility is designed to ―make the
physical and derivatives portfolios of the largest traders in referenced contracts visible to the
Commission.‖87 According the Proposed Rules, the position visibility regime would ―improve
the Commission‘s ability to monitor the positions of the largest traders … and the effects on the
markets of those large positions.‖88 If a trader holds or controls positions in referenced contracts
that exceed the proposed visibility levels as determined by the Commission, the trader would be
required to submit information about ―cash market and derivatives activity, including data
relating to substantially the same commodity.‖89
However, the proposed rules do not impose the visibility requirements on referenced
agricultural contracts. In doing so, the Commission fails to provide any justification for such
exclusion. Under sections 4a and 8a(5) of the CEA, the Commission is statutorily permitted to
establish reporting requirements necessary to establish and enforce position limits. Pursuant to
this authority, the Commission should impose the visibility requirements on agricultural
contracts. During the extensive periods of excessive volatility in agricultural markets, the
visibility requirements warrant strong support.
International Regulatory Arbitrage Would Be Minimal
The imposition of position limits has inspired concerns stating in a global market that,
―[i]f you restrict them in the United States only, there is going to be some regulatory arbitrage.‖90
Similarly, some banks have advanced an argument that they will figure out a clever
technological way to trade abroad or relocate themselves offshore. However, this is not the case.
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First, Congress in requiring position limits did not say that they should be abandoned if
there is a ―race to the bottom‖ among nations.
Second, trading abroad will still fall within U.S. jurisdiction if it has substantial effect on
domestic markets.91 Indeed, U.S. citizens are subject to criminal sanctions if they use foreign
exchanges to adversely impact domestic markets and, in most instances, would be extradited
back to the U.S. to face criminal or civil charges, if their actions impact domestic markets and
have any meaningful contacts with the U.S.92
The alleged international regulatory arbitrage, if any, will have minimal impact for the
following three reasons. First, the law is clear on the extraterritorial jurisdictional power of the
Commission as granted by Section 722, which amends Section 2 of the CEA, of the Dodd-Frank
Act:
The provisions of this Act relating to swaps that were enacted by the Wall
Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 (including any rule
prescribed or regulation promulgated under that Act), shall not apply to
activities outside the United States unless those activities—
(1) have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or
effect on, commerce of the United States; or
(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may
prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate to
prevent the evasion of any provision of this Act that was enacted by
the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010.93
If the Commission can demonstrate ―direct and significant effect‖ on the U.S. commerce, under
subparagraph (2) above, the CFTC has complete discretion to take necessary or appropriate
actions to prevent the evasion of any provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Third, a person outside the U.S. who engages in swap dealing activities and regularly
enters into swaps with U.S. persons would likely be required to register as a swap dealer under
new Section 2(i) of the CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank. As a registered entity, it will be
subject to all data reporting requirements as well as other relevant provisions under the
Commission‘s jurisdiction.
Fourth, other international financial regulatory authorities are working closely with U.S.
regulators to implement comparable rules and regulations. It is clear that Middle Eastern,
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African, and Asian countries have a greater hostility to the ―financialization‖ of commodity
markets than is found here in the U.S.94
It should also be noted that many foreign jurisdictions may not be all that hospitable to
expatriate Too Big To Fail U.S. banks. The U.K. and other European supporters have proposed,
for example, ―an overall 15-20 per cent [core tier one capital] ratio‖95 for systemically risky
banks compared to the 7 per cent Basel III standard, the latter of which the U.S. supports.
Increasing financial contacts with those jurisdictions would cause banks to incur what they deem
as highly unattractive capital charges, not to mention highly unfavorable tax rates.
Therefore, even if Congress had permitted international arbitrage to blunt its mandate of
aggregate position limits (which it did not), the only real adverse arbitrage will come from the
Commission refusing to impose congressionally mandate position limits, thereby allowing the
U.S. to continue as the foremost commodity casino in the world and the country bearing the
greatest responsibility for worldwide dysfunctions in soaring commodity prices which have no
relationship to market fundamentals. That is certainly not what Congress intended when it
enacted Section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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